Important: An indictment is an allegation. I am presumed innocent unless and until the government proves every element beyond a reasonable doubt in court.
The Fifth Circuit decision addressed whether the superseding indictment was legally sufficient to move forward at the pleading stage. It did not decide that any statement was actually false, that any alleged statement was material, or that any particular investor was actually defrauded. Those questions are for trial, with the government bearing the burden of proof.
The Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kousisis v. United States. In plain English, Kousisis involved alleged lies used to obtain contract payments. The Supreme Court explained that fraud can exist when a material lie is used to obtain money or property, even if the other side later argues it got some value in return.
My view is that the Fifth Circuit applied that reasoning too broadly to public market commentary. A fraud case still requires proof of a materially false statement, materiality, and intent. Converting public discussion about trading into criminal fraud risks turning everyday market speech into a felony, and that is not a stable foundation for free markets or free expression.
In securities, “materiality” is not a popularity test and it is not “anything a follower might find important.” The Supreme Court’s securities cases use the “total mix” standard: a fact is material only if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important because it significantly alters the total mix of information available about the issuer and the security’s value.
That “total mix” is issuer level information tied to the company and the security itself, such as financial results and condition, operations, regulatory posture, major corporate events, and required disclosures. A third party speaker’s personal trading posture, subjective price targets, or a future plan to sell concerns the speaker, not the issuer, and does not change that issuer information.
That distinction matters here because influence alone is not materiality. In my view, the government must identify a concrete issuer level falsehood and explain why it is materially misleading under the total mix standard. Opinions, predictions, and ordinary trader talk are not automatically fraud, and omissions are not actionable absent a duty to speak or a misleading half truth about the same issuer subject.
Markets are loud by design. People share bullish and bearish views, post charts, debate catalysts, and change their minds in real time. If prosecutors can treat public trading commentary as a criminal "scheme" without clear, objective falsity and clear materiality, the result is a chilling effect on speech and a blurry line between fraud and disagreement. That is dangerous for market participants, creators, and everyday retail traders.
I respectfully disagree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision and will continue to challenge the government’s theory in court. I maintain my innocence.